Subject: Background on Pakistani ISI Responsibility for the Raymond Davis Incident in Lahore
DOI: 27 January 2011 and afterwards
DOA: 27 February 2011
Source Description: A Serving Officer of the Pakistani ISI
1. (Source Comment: Prior to 27 January 2011, the Pakistani ISI became aware that Raymond Davis was engaging in unilateral operations in Pakistan, and assumed it was on behalf of the CIA. The more paranoid officers of the ISI believe that Pakistan is overrun with thousands of CIA unilateral operatives. The more realistic ones believe that the non-liaison component of Islamabad Station and its bases are more in the neighborhood of several dozens, but even one is intolerable to the ISI sense of Pakistani sovereignty. In order to send the CIA a message, the ISI began to harass those whom they believed were unilateral CIA officers not introduced by CIA to the ISI as liaison officers.)
2. The two motorcyclists killed by Raymond Davis on 27 January 2010, Faizan and Faheem, were not ISI officers, but were common criminals paid by the ISI in Lahore to harass Davis; their brief was to make his trip through Lahore difficult for him, but not actually to kill him. The ISI assumes that Davis misread their intentions and thought he was going to be shot himself. (Source Comment: This would not be a difficult misreading considering the gun that one of them was waving.)
3. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Pakistani terrorist group with ISI connections, has an office in the Mozang Chungi area of Lahore, the area where the shooting took place. The ISI speculates that Davis was engaged in a surveillance detection route (SDR) before making a clandestine meeting with a CIA unilateral agent within Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, or that Davis was preparing to initiate a unilateral technical operation against the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi offices. The ISI intended the harassment to keep Davis away from the area of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi offices, as the ISI considers Lashkar-e-Jhangvi one of its own operational assets.
4. (Field Comment: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a militant neo-wahabbi organization formed in 1996 and in 2001 designated by both the US Department of State and the Pakistani Government as a terrorist organization. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi activities have included the kidnapping and brutal murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007.)
5. (Source Comment: One indication of Pakistani government or ISI intervention in this case is that the the police have pressed a charge for arms possession. This is typically included in charge-sheets against people in serious cases where the government wants to make certain they are convicted simply because it is easy to gain a conviction if a weapon is recovered from the crime scene; a prosecutor can easily secure seven years jail time on the arms charge even if the other terrorism or murder charges cannot be proven adequately.)
6. One reason why there has been less publicity regarding the person killed by the US Consulate in Lahore vehicle speeding to the aid of Davies is that the family of the person struck by that vehicle rapidly accepted an offer from the US embassy of a large cash payment and four immigrant visas to the US for family members.
7. (Source Comment: There have been press reports of official US contacts with the families of the two slain men, Faizan and Faheem, which the ISI assumes are true because it would be in the interest of the US to do; the families are preparing for a large cash settlement. Shumalaila, the widow of Faheem, was in a love marriage with Faheem, a marriage not receiving the approval of Faheem’s family. In order to ensure that any cash received stayed in Faheem’s blood line, they drove Shumalaila from the house as soon as the shooting occurred and in desperation she committed suicide. As further insurance that only Faheem’s blood family would receive any of the settlement, they also tried to kill Sarwar, Shumalaila’s uncle and nearest blood relative.)
8. (Source Comment: While the ISI did not anticipate this incident, once it happened they pressed their advantage against the CIA presence in Pakistan, on the assumption that the ISI could “tame” the CIA station chief in Islamabad to desist from unilateral operations and stay within the confines of pleasant if unproductive liaison lunches with ISI Division A officers. The ISI considers the ISAF near-total dependence on Pakistan as a logistic supply route for the war in Afghanistan gives the ISI the upper hand in pressing the CIA – and the attack several days ago on an ISAF logistic convoy in Pakistan was carried out by the ISI to re-enforce that point. The ISI has no “game plan” in this operation, but is flying by the seat of their pants to push their unanticipated advantage as far as they can against the CIA. CIA concessions merely encourage the ISI to push harder. The Davis case will not be settled until the ISI feels it has pushed the CIA as far as it can.)